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Abstract
Intact ecosystems provide important global services.  Many valuable ecosystems are located in
low-income countries in which citizens are not in a position to provide global public goods gratis.  To
address this problem, international conservation and development donors have been making substantial
investments in habitat conservation.  Among the more common conservation schemes are interventions
aimed at encouraging commercial activities that produce ecosystem services as joint products.  We argue
that it would be more cost-effective to pay for conservation performance directly.  We use a simple yet
general model to establish three conclusions.  First, the overall cost of conservation is least when direct
payments are employed.  Second, the donor will generally find direct payments more cost-effective.
Third, the preferences of donors and eco-entrepreneurs are opposed: when the donor prefers direct
payments, the eco-entrepreneur prefers indirect subsidies.  There are a number of reasons why direct
incentive programs may be difficult to implement.  We argue, however, that any approach to conservation
will face similar challenges.  Furthermore, we demonstrate with an empirical example that direct payment
initiatives can offer spectacular cost-savings relative to less direct approaches.  We therefore believe that
continued experimentation with direct conservation incentives in the developing world is warranted and
will prove successful.
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The Cost-Effectiveness of Conservation Payments
Paul J. Ferraro and R. David Simpson∗
Introduction
Intact ecosystems provide important global services, including the regulation of climate
and the protection of biodiversity.  Many valuable ecosystems, including the majority of tropical
rainforests, are located in low-income countries.  The citizens of low-income countries receive
few of the global benefits derived from their ecosystems.  With limited resources and myriad
pressing social needs, they are not in a position to provide global ecosystem services gratis.
To help low-income nations conserve their endangered ecosystems, international
conservation and development donors have made substantial investments over the last two
decades.  Between 1988 and mid-1995, the World Bank committed $1.25 billion in loans,
credits, and grants for projects with explicit objectives to conserve biodiversity.  This money
leveraged an additional half billion dollars (Jana and Cooke 1996, 107).  The United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) spent $650 million each year on its
environmental portfolio during the early 1990s (USAID 1994).
Among the more common conservation schemes are interventions aimed at encouraging
commercial activities that produce ecosystem services as joint products.  Such interventions have
been initiated by the World Bank; the United Nations Environment Program; the Inter-American
Development Bank; the Asian Development Bank; the European Union; bilateral aid
organizations of Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United States; and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the World Wildlife Fund,
Conservation International, Cultural Survival, and the International Union for the Conservation
of Nature (Wells et al. 1992; Brown and Wyckoff-Baird 1994; Conservation International 1994;
Cultural Survival 1994; Simpson and Sedjo 1996; Southgate 1998; Honey 1999).  Examples of
projects undertaken include ecotourism, biodiversity prospecting, non-timber forest product
extraction, and selective logging.  These activities typically employ relatively undisturbed
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ecosystems as inputs.  The ecosystems are combined with purchased inputs such as capital and
labor to produce a valuable output, such as tourist excursions, novel chemical compounds, fruits,
or timber.
To encourage these eco-friendly activities, donor funds are often directed towards
increasing the eco-output price or facilitating the acquisition of complementary inputs, such as
tourism infrastructure, product marketing, and processing facilities.  The assumption underlying
such interventions is simple: local agents, faced with cheaper inputs or higher output prices for
an eco-friendly activity, will use a greater area of intact ecosystem, thereby contributing to an
increase in the provision of environmental services.
The introduction of new technologies and employment opportunities in rural
environments, however, can be a challenge (World Bank 1988).  It is thus not surprising that
many reviews of conservation interventions report that they have had limited success in
achieving their objectives (Wells and Brandon 1992; Ferraro et al. 1997; World Bank 1997;
Oates 1999).  Approaches based on eco-friendly commercial activities1 are plagued by the
indirect nature of the conservation incentives they generate, by the complexity of their
implementation, and by their lack of conformity with the temporal and spatial dimensions of
ecosystem conservation objectives (Ferraro et al. 1997; Southgate 1998; Chomitz and Kumari
1998; Simpson 1999; Ferraro 2000).
An alternative approach to encouraging the conservation of endangered natural
ecosystems is to pay for conservation performance directly.  In this approach, host-country and
international actors make payments to individuals or groups that supply services of ecological
value.  The idea of directly contracting with individuals to maintain resources that have global
value is not new (e.g., Barbier and Rauscher 1995; Barrett 1995; Simpson and Sedjo 1996;
Ferraro 2000).  We are not aware, however, of any formal analysis comparing the effectiveness
of direct payment interventions to the indirect interventions that have, to date, been more widely
adopted in low-income countries.  Our intention is to begin to fill this analytical gap.2
                                                
1   Such projects occur as elements of “integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs),” “gestion de
terroirs,” and “community-based natural resource management.” Our sense is that, while different titles are coined
over time, the same types of field interventions are instituted under each.
2   There are a number of contributions to the existing public finance and environmental economics literature that
considers choices between taxes and subsidies, and various combinations of both (e. g., Fullerton and Wolverton,
1997; Goulder et al. 1997; Eskeland and Devarajan 1996). We are not aware, however, of any previous work
focusing on the cost-effectiveness of alternative subsidies.Resources for the Future Ferraro and Simpson
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We use a simple model in which an entrepreneur operates an ecologically benign
production process.  We focus on two among perhaps many inputs.  The first input, “forest,”
could represent any ecological attribute useful in the generation of an eco-friendly output.  The
second input, “capital,” could represent any input or aggregation of other inputs.
Another actor, whom we will refer to as the “donor,” wishes to induce greater
conservation of forest than the entrepreneur achieves under prevailing market conditions.   The
donor can motivate greater conservation indirectly by subsidizing either the use of capital or the
eco-output price.  Subsidizing capital purchases would be a useful conservation strategy only to
the extent that capital and forest are complements in the production of the eco-friendly output.
We will assume this throughout.  It is worth noting that this assumption, which motivates many
initiatives observed in practice, may not always be valid.  Conservation practitioners must
therefore evaluate its validity before proposing any capital subsidies to purportedly eco-friendly
activities.
Alternatively, the donor can make a direct payment for every unit of forest protected.  A
direct payment is equivalent in our model to subsidizing the use of forests in eco-friendly
activities.
The overall cost of conservation can be defined as the payments made by the donor for
conservation (whether direct or indirect), less whatever profits arise from the eco-friendly
activity.  We consider the costs of inducing conservation in excess of the forest area that would
be chosen by a profit-maximizing entrepreneur responding to market prices.  We reach three
conclusions.  First, the overall cost of conservation is least when direct payments are employed.
Second, the donor will find direct payments more cost-effective under what we will argue are
“normal” conditions.  Third, the preferences of donors and eco-entrepreneurs are opposed: when
the donor prefers direct payments, the eco-entrepreneur prefers indirect subsidies.  However,
given that the direct approach is socially efficient, there is always the potential for the agent who
prefers the direct approach to compensate the other agent such that they both prefer the direct
approach.
A number of economists (Pearce and Moran 1994; Anderson and Leal 1998; Heal 1999)
have argued that eco-friendly activities can be profitable in some settings and should be
encouraged.  We do not disagree with the proposition that activities that are good for both
entrepreneurs and the environment are desirable.  Nor do we dispute that interventions should be
initiated when local people do not preserve as much as outsiders are willing to pay for.  When
donors perceive the need for more conservation than markets provide, however, they shouldResources for the Future Ferraro and Simpson
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offer the most cost-effective incentive.  This issue has not been adequately addressed.  Our
intention in writing this article is to engage other economists in an overdue discussion of what
policy advice those of our profession ought to be providing to conservation practitioners.
Since one argument against direct incentives might be that they are impractical, we
present, in the next section, examples of direct payment conservation approaches in both high-
and low-income countries.  In Sections 2 and 3, we introduce the model we will employ in our
analysis and demonstrate that a direct payment approach is the least-overall-cost conservation
strategy.  In Section 4, we derive the conditions under which the donor prefers the direct
approach, and in Section 5, we demonstrate that the incentives of the outside donor and the local
agent are opposed.  In Section 6, we provide an empirical example demonstrating the relative
cost-effectiveness of direct as opposed to indirect interventions.  In the final two sections, we
discuss our results and conclude.
1. Direct Payment Initiatives
Paying individuals or groups for supplying goods and services of ecological value is not
merely a speculative proposal.  There are a variety of such programs already in existence
(Ferraro 2000).  The best-known conservation payment initiatives are the agricultural land
diversion programs of high-income nations.  In Europe, fourteen nations spent an estimated $11
billion between 1993 and 1997 to divert over 20 million hectares into long-term set-aside and
forestry contracts (OECD 1997).  In the United States, the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP)
spends about $1.5 billion annually to contract for 12–15 million hectares.
These conservation contracting programs account for only a small percent of agricultural
support budgets, but they are among the fastest growing payments to farmers in high-income
nations (OECD 1997, 14).  Their dramatic growth is partly due to their popularity among various
stakeholders and the opportunities they afford for flexible targeting and adjustment to local
conditions (OECD 1997, 20, 48).  Moreover, payments for enhancing the supply of
environmental goods and services are likely to be one of the few government transfers to rural
farmers that global trade organizations, like the World Trade Organization (WTO), will
countenance (Potter and Ervin 1999).
Local and state governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are also
actively involved in direct approaches to ecosystem conservation.  For example, local and state
governments in the United States, Costa Rica, and Brazil give property tax breaks to landowners
who manage their land for conservation.  In North America, the Delta Waterfowl Foundation’sResources for the Future Ferraro and Simpson
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“adopt-a-pothole” program pays prairie farmers who protect nesting areas for ducks (Delta
Waterfowl Foundation 2000).  Another NGO, Defenders of Wildlife, has a program that rewards
U.S. landowners who can demonstrate that there are occupied wolf dens on their property
(Defenders of Wildlife 2000).
Although rare outside of high-income countries, direct payment systems can also be
found in the tropics.  In the last four years, Costa Ricans have created institutional mechanisms
through which local, national, and international beneficiaries of ecosystem services compensate
those who protect ecosystems (Castro et al. 1998; Calvo and Navarrete 1999).  Costa Rica’s
1996 Forestry Law (no. 7575) explicitly recognizes four ecosystem services: carbon fixation and
sequestration, hydrological services, biodiversity protection, and scenic beauty.  The law gives
landowners the opportunity to be compensated for the provision of these services.
Costa Rican practitioners have identified sources of financing and have developed rules
for allocating available funds.  Funds are currently allocated through the National Forestry
Financial Fund (FONAFIFO), which works directly with landowners and indirectly through
third-party intermediaries (e.g., NGOs).  FONAFIFO raises money from international donors and
national sources, such as a fuel tax and payments made by hydroelectric plants.  FONAFIFO
then distributes the money through contractual arrangements with private individuals and groups.
FONAFIFO establishes contracts for three land use categories: reforestation, sustainable
timber management, and forest preservation.  The forest preservation category is the most
common contract.  Each category is associated with a fixed annual payment per hectare ($35-
$45/ha).  Regional conservation agents and third-party NGOs identify potential participants
based on regional conservation priorities.  They often target land buffers around protected areas.
Landowners who are awarded contracts receive annual payments if they comply with the
contract.
Costa Rica’s Environmental Services Payment (ESP) program is very new, but it appears
to be having some success.  A recent trip to Costa Rica by one of the authors (June 1999)
revealed that there is support for the ESP program from many sectors and more landowners are
seeking contracts than there is money to pay for them.  In the remainder of the paper we look at
the reasons why a direct payment conservation program such as Costa Rica’s may be superior to
the indirect conservation interventions more commonly encountered in the low-income nations.Resources for the Future Ferraro and Simpson
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2. The Model
We compare direct and indirect conservation interventions in a simple, yet general,
model.  An “eco-entrepreneur” produces a quantity Q of an “eco-friendly” product using a
production technology, f(K, F).  We will refer to K as capital, but it could be more broadly
interpreted as any input or aggregate of other inputs.  We will refer to F as forest, but it can be
any ecosystem that the entrepreneur uses in her eco-production activities.  The model is easily
generalized to consider multiple inputs and quality-adjusted quantities of output.
Examples of eco-friendly outputs include eco-tourism and bioprospecting (the search
among diverse natural organisms for commercial products of industrial, agricultural, or
pharmaceutical value).3  The prices of output, capital, and forest, are pQ, pK, and pF, respectively.
The price of forest, pF, can be viewed as the opportunity cost of using forest in eco-production
instead of, for example, agriculture.
We assume that the eco-entrepreneur behaves as a profit maximizer with competitive
conjectures in both input and output markets.  Our results also obtain under the weaker, but
empirically plausible, assumption that the eco-entrepreneur is able to price-discriminate in the
purchase of forest.  We assume that output would be positive in the absence of outside
interventions.  If offering capital or output subsidies to an existing eco-enterprise is a
questionable conservation policy, offering these subsidies when there is little evidence of the
enterprise’s viability seems more questionable yet.
It is more convenient to work with a profit function as opposed to a production function
approach.  We will define the profit function in the usual fashion,
() () {} F p K p F K f p
F K
p p p F K Q F K Q − − = ,
,
max , , π .( 1 )
It will be useful to exploit the derivative properties of the profit function as summarized








                                                
3   The model could easily be extended to the sustainable harvest of nontimber forest products or timber, but doing
so would require the incorporation of additional variables representing “natural capital” comprised of stocks of
timber or nontimber forest products, and their price.  This would complicate what is intended to be a relatively
simple and straightforward exposition without changing its general results.Resources for the Future Ferraro and Simpson
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Q Q π = , (2a)
K K π − = , (2b)
and
F F π − = . (2c)
In the interest of giving the benefit of the doubt to the indirect strategies, we will make







In other words, we will assume that what we refer to as “complementary capital” is, in fact, a
complement to forest in eco-friendly production.  Second, and contrary to some examples (Peters
1994; Honey 1999), we will suppose that what is purported to be “eco-production” is, in fact,
eco-friendly. We suppose, then, that a unit of forest in eco-production provides the same quantity
and quality of environmental services as a unit of strictly protected forest.4
We have assumed that eco-production is positive in the absence of outside interventions.
However, an outside agent, the “donor,” believes that not enough forest is being protected (or
equivalently, given our assumptions, being used in eco-production).  The donor would like to
intervene and encourage more forest protection.
In our model, the donor has two options: an indirect intervention or a direct intervention.
An indirect intervention renders eco-production more profitable by subsidizing the eco-output
price or the acquisition of complementary capital.  Indirect subsidies induce the eco-entrepreneur
to use more forest in eco-production, thereby generating more environmental services.
A direct intervention refers to performance payments made by the donor for forest
protection.  A direct payment for intact forest is equivalent to subsidizing the use of forest in eco-
friendly activities.  The payments may be periodic or one-off.  We have chosen the term “direct”
                                                
4   A debate rages in the conservation literature as to what, precisely, is entitled to be designated as “ecotourism,” or
more generally, “sustainable use.”  We infer from this that many of the activities in which entrepreneurs might
choose to engage in natural ecosystems would not, in fact, be consistent with the unspoiled preservation of such
systems.  We are thus taking a rosier view of the assertion that indirect incentives can be effective in promoting
conservation than the facts may support.Resources for the Future Ferraro and Simpson
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inasmuch as the essence of our argument is that “you get what you pay for.”  Our results below
suggest that if the donor wants to achieve forest preservation, the most effective way to do so is
to pay for the preservation of forest per se, rather than for something else that is only indirectly
related.
3. The Cost of Conservation
Let us first consider the overall costs of conservation.  In order to compare the costs of
direct and indirect interventions, we proceed in the following manner.  We compare the costs of
forest and capital that generate the same increase in forest protected (and hence, under our
assumptions, used in eco-production).  We demonstrate first that for a given increase in forest
protected, the indirect intervention requires higher capital use.  As the amount of forest area
protected under both interventions is the same by construction, overall costs of eco-production
are higher under the indirect intervention.  The value of eco-output is also somewhat higher, but
not enough to offset the higher costs of the indirect approach.  Thus, the overall costs of the
indirect intervention are higher.  As we will see in the empirical example in Section 6, the cost
differences between direct and indirect approaches can be dramatic.
We assume that the capital subsidy, dpK < 0, and the forest subsidy, dpF < 0, are small
and we evaluate the local impacts of subsidies on the production decisions of the eco-
entrepreneur.  Let dK
I be the change in capital use under the indirect intervention, and dK
D be the
change in capital use under the direct intervention.  From expression 2b, we know
K K π − = * .
Taking derivatives,
K KK
I dp dK π = (4)
and
F KF
D dp dK π − = .( 5 )
We choose dpF and dpK such that they both induce a one-unit increase in forest protected:
K
K
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Convexity of the profit function in prices and the assumed complementarity between capital and
forest imply that both the numerator and denominator are positive.
We demonstrate in the appendix that the incremental cost of using the indirect approach
rather than the direct approach is  ()




.  The intuition is straightforward.  The
direct subsidy on forest purchase achieves a one unit increase in forest protection with the least
overall distortion.  When some positive incremental change in forest protected is desired, it can
be most efficiently accomplished by applying a subsidy to the good from which the externality
arises, as opposed to another good that is only indirectly related.
The analysis of an indirect output subsidy is analogous.  The overall costs of the output
subsidy are higher than the costs of the direct forest subsidy.  We can also follow steps analogous
to those in expressions (4) through (9) above to demonstrate that using a mix of indirect and
direct subsidies is never more cost-effective than using the direct subsidy alone.Resources for the Future Ferraro and Simpson
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4. Subsidies and the Donor’s Incentives
Given that conservation donors with limited budgets dictate the choice of intervention,
the “cost to donor” might be a more important criterion for comparing direct and indirect
approaches than “overall cost.”  Our derivations below, however, suggest that the donor will
typically prefer the direct approach.
As in the previous section, the donor can motivate conservation by providing either (1) a
subsidy of dpF per unit of forest protected (employed in eco-production), or (2) a subsidy of dpK
per unit of complementary capital employed in eco-production.  The donor prefers the approach
that minimizes his total costs of providing the subsidy.  If the donor prefers the direct payment
approach, it will be because
K dp F dp K F − < −  (10)
(recall that per-unit subsidies are presumed negative in both instances).
Under the assumption that both subsidies assure equal incremental acquisition of forest
for the eco-friendly activity, dpF and dpK are as given in (6a) and (6b), respectively.  Making
these substitutions in (10), and multiplying both sides by pF we obtain










Noting that, by symmetry of cross-price derivatives,  F K p K p F ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ , and multiplying both
sides by pF and negative one, we have
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Thus the donor will prefer to subsidize the use of forest directly if the demand for capital is less
elastic with respect to the price of forest than is the demand for forest itself.
To interpret (13) further, recall that the convexity of the profit function in prices implies
that the principal minors of its Hessian matrix be positive.  Specifically,
() 0
2 > − FK KK FF π π π . (14)Resources for the Future Ferraro and Simpson
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or, rearranging one more time to express relationships as elasticities,
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Since factor demands and prices are all positive,





































or, dividing both sides by K,
0 = + + KK KF KQ η η η . (16a)
Similarly,
0 = + + FK FF FQ η η η . (17)










From expression (10), we know that a sufficient condition for the donor to prefer the
direct approach is that η KF/η FF < 1.  Thus, if the left-hand side of (18) is no greater than one, (10)
holds and the direct approach is preferred.  The left-hand side of (18) is one if the eco-friendly
production function is homothetic.Resources for the Future Ferraro and Simpson
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Our results suggest that the donor prefers the direct payment approach under a broad
class of production technologies.  We have performed numerical exercises using a wide variety
of non-homothetic functions and have found no counter-examples.  Conservation practitioners
should be wary of adopting indirect approaches.
5. Subsidies and the Eco-Entrepreneur’s Incentives
We have demonstrated that the overall costs of conservation are lower when forest
protection is achieved through direct subsidies.  Moreover, under plausible assumptions, the
conservation donor will also prefer the direct approach.  We now demonstrate that the
preferences of the donor and the eco-entrepreneur are opposed: if one prefers the direct
approach, the other prefers the indirect approach.  The intuition underlying this result is
straightforward: the donor wants to minimize the value of the subsidy he offers, whereas the eco-
entrepreneur wants to maximize the value of the subsidy she receives.
Let dπ
I be the change in eco-entrepreneur profit under the indirect approach and let dπ
D






















where, again, we have used Hotelling’s Lemma and dpK is given in (6b).
Combining (19) and (20), the eco-entrepreneur will prefer the direct subsidy to the
indirect if dπ  F > dπ  K or
K dp F dp K F − > − . (21)
Expression (21) is exactly the reverse of expression (10).  Given that the direct approach is
always more cost-effective, the agent that prefers the direct approach could potentially make a
transfer to the other agent such that they both prefer the direct approach.  In other words, the
donor and the entrepreneur could share the costs of the additional units of protected forest in a
way that leads them both to prefer the direct approach.
Although our simple model captures a wide variety of possible conservation approaches,
it does not encompass the entire universe of possible indirect interventions.  In particular, it doesResources for the Future Ferraro and Simpson
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not consider so-called “conservation by distraction” (CBD) interventions.5  CBD interventions,
such as providing off-farm employment opportunities or promoting labor-absorbing technical
change in agriculture, are attempts to direct capital and labor away from ecosystems.
Our analysis, however, is relevant to one particularly popular CBD approach to
conservation in low-income nations: agricultural intensification interventions (Wells and
Brandon 1992).  Such interventions aim to encourage alternative production patterns that require
less land to achieve a given production/income level.  For example, conservation practitioners
may subsidize commercial fertilizer inputs.  Some authors have argued that commercial fertilizer
is a technical substitute for the biomass fertilizer accessed through cutting and burning forest
parcels (e.g., Sanchez et al. 1982).6  Our model could easily be adapted to examine CBD
measures.  Consider an entrepreneur who engages in eco-un-friendly production.  A direct
payment for non-use is the same as an increase in the price of using forest for agriculture, and
thus our results translate: subsidizing fertilizer is likely to be more expensive than making a
direct payment for land conserved.
6. An Empirical Example
From 1991-1995, one of the authors participated in a conservation field initiative in the
eastern rain forests of Madagascar.7  The goal of the project was to increase the value of intact
ecosystems through three indirect methods: forest management, bee keeping, and aquatic species
management.  In the following empirical example, we compare the cost-effectiveness of the bee-
keeping initiative (Ferraro and Razafimamonjy 1993) to that of a direct forest subsidy scheme.
The underlying assumption of the bee-keeping initiative is simple.  The production of
honey and beeswax requires nectar and pollen inputs from melliferous plants, which are found in
the rain forest.  Bee keeping as a means to promote conservation is quite popular, and
                                                
5  The CBD term was suggested by Franz Tattenbach, Director of the Fundación para el Desarrollo de la Cordillera
Volcánica Central (FUNDECOR) in Costa Rica.
6  The assumption that commercial fertilizers are technical substitutes for land in low-income nations, however, may
not be correct (e.g., Lewandroski et al.).
7  The project was funded by the Sophie Danforth Conservation Biology Fund of the Rhode Island Zoological
Society, the Rainforest Alliance’s Kleinhan’s Fellowship, and the Biodiversity Support Program (Grant #7529) of
the World Wildlife Fund, World Resources Institute, and the Nature Conservancy.Resources for the Future Ferraro and Simpson
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descriptions of such initiatives can be found in many conservation project documents (e.g.,
Ambougou 1993; PPNR 1995).
The Madagascar bee-keeping initiative targeted the semi-modern regional apiculture
technology that uses top-bar hives housed in wooden boxes.  The bee boxes are placed near
villages at the edge of forests.  As in our previous analytical exercise, we view the production of
honey as a function of forest, F, and capital, K.  An apiculturalist allocates a fixed number of
labor units per bee box, and we take advantage of this complementarity to combine labor and bee
boxes into the variable K.  We assume that all bee boxes are placed at the edge of the forest.  The
foraging pattern of bees, the finite supply of food per unit area of forest, and the prohibitive labor
cost of safeguarding hives placed inside the forest lead to a decreasing returns-to-scale
production technology.8
In order to estimate a production function for honey, we use biological and economic
data collected in Madagascar (Ferraro and Razafimamonjy 1993; Ralimanana 1994) and
published behavioral data on honeybees (Jaycox 1982; Hooper 1991).9  The data were fit to a
Cobb-Douglas production function, which provides reasonable production estimates for the
nearby foraging area used most frequently by a colony of bees.
The estimated apiculture production function is
15 . 36 . 48 ) , ( F K F K f q = =
where q is liters of honey, K is a unit of capital (two bee boxes and associated labor), and F is
hectares of forest.  We conducted the empirical analysis in Malagasy francs (Fmg), but converted
all values to U.S. dollars using an early 1990s exchange rate of 2000 Fmg/$.  Prices are listed in
Table 1.  All input prices are annual rental prices.
Under current prices, the representative household employs thirty bee boxes and about
one-third of a hectare of forest in apiculture.  Now consider a conservation donor that wishes to
induce beekeepers to protect one more hectare of forest.  We will assume that the donor
accomplishes his objective by inducing ten households to conserve 0.10 more hectares of forest
                                                
8 Bees tend to forage close to the hive, particularly in rain forest environments.  Few bees forage beyond 2.5
kilometers and most forage within 0.5 kilometers.  Bees traveling farther from the hive contribute less to honey
production than those foraging close by.
9  The most common honey bee in Madagascar is A. mellifera unicolor, a subspecies of the European honey bee.Resources for the Future Ferraro and Simpson
15
each.  As in our analysis above, the donor can choose a direct approach and subsidize the forest
input, or he can choose an indirect approach and subsidize the price of capital or output.  The
direct and indirect subsidies that generate a one-hectare increase in forest protected by ten
representative households are listed in Table 1.
Table 1 – Apiculture Prices and Conservation Subsidies
Variable Price Subsidy
Honey (per liter) $1.00 $0.14
Forest (per hectare) $50.00 $9.34
Capital (per 2 bee boxes) $2.57 $0.79
Table 2 shows, for each approach, the costs to the donor, the additional profits to the ten
eco-entrepreneurs (original profit/entrepreneur= $52.57), and the overall costs.  It also includes
the overall incremental cost of choosing the indirect approaches over the direct approach.
Table 2 – Direct and Indirect Subsidies Inducing a One-Hectare Increase in Forest
Protected
Subsidy Donor Cost Additional Profit
(for 10 households)
Overall Cost Cost-Savings of
Forest Subsidy
Forest $39.45 $34.41 $5.04 --------
Capital $225.29 $163.35 $61.94 $56.90
Output $174.54 $163.30 $11.24 $6.20
The cost-savings achieved by the direct approach are significant.  For the same increase
in forest protected, the indirect approach has an overall cost more than twelve times that of the
direct approach.  From the perspective of the donor, the indirect approach can be five times more
expensive than the direct approach.  Note that the donor’s cost per additional hectare of forest
protected under the direct approach is about 79% of the full opportunity costs of using forest forResources for the Future Ferraro and Simpson
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apiculture rather than for crop agriculture.10  In contrast, the cost of the indirect approach is over
350% of the opportunity costs of using forest for apiculture—it would be far cheaper simply to
buy the land outright.  These dramatic relative differences are maintained when sensitivity
analyses are conducted by varying the parameters of the production function.
As predicted in the previous sections, the entrepreneur’s preferences are opposite those of
the donor.  Under the indirect approach, profits increase by over 30%, while they increase by less
than 10% under the direct approach.  Note, however, that the donor could make a transfer to the
eco-entrepreneur such that they would both prefer the direct approach to the indirect approach.
We should also note that we implicitly made several assumptions that gave the indirect
approaches more legitimacy than they perhaps deserve.  First, we assumed that every unit of
forest contributes equally to honey production, when in reality there is a small set of melliferous
plants with heterogeneous distributions.  A pollen analysis by Ralimanana (1994) indicates that
four species make up 45% of the total pollen found in the regional honey.  Of these four species,
one is not native.  Depending on the village, Ralimamana also found that anywhere from 0–97%
of the pollen came from secondary forests or exotic plantations.  Thus, conservation practitioners
cannot be sure that the forest ecosystems desired for conservation are the same ecosystems
desired for apiculture.
We also assumed that there are no incentives to manipulate the quality of forest to
enhance production.  However, of the forty-six melliferous plants identified, local residents
identified 25% as being highly desirable due to their contribution to taste and color.  Another
25% were identified as undesirable.  Thus enhanced indirect apiculture incentives may increase
the incentives to manipulate habitat to enhance production, which could have undesirable
conservation impacts (similar incentives have been identified under other indirect interventions;
see Southgate (1997) and Chomitz and Kumari (1998)).11
Finally, we assumed that an increase in output price or a decrease in capital price induces
local agents to protect more forest.  Bee pollen and nectar, however, provide non-excludable
                                                
10  We are, of course, assuming that a household has no other eco-friendly values for the forest other than as an input
to apiculture.  The existence of other values implies that a lower forest subsidy could generate the same increase in
forest protected.
11  Pawlick (1989) suggests that the “secret” to enhancing food supply in apiculture is to plant “trees which are
actually somewhat ill-suited to their environment.”  Such manipulations will lead to staggered and often abundant
flowering periods across species.Resources for the Future Ferraro and Simpson
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benefits.  If a local agent protects a forest, she cannot prevent her neighbors’ bees from foraging
on her plants.  The benefits of cutting down forest and planting crops, however, are excludable.
Thus, unless payments are tied specifically to forest use, there may be very little impact on forest
protection via increased profitability of apiculture.  The local agent might calculate that the best
course of action is to use her forest for agriculture and allow her bees to forage on neighboring
forest parcels.
7. Discussion
We anticipate that some readers will think we are guilty of adopting an “assume a can
opener” approach.12  Although we have highlighted recent experimentation with direct payment
conservation initiatives in Section 2, there are clearly barriers to implementing the approach in
low-income nations.  In particular, markets for intact ecosystems are often absent, or are
imperfect in that the costs of enforcing property rights are prohibitive.  We have ignored a
variety of issues that will be important in any contracting initiative for habitat conservation in
low-income nations.  These issues include minimizing transaction costs, designing and targeting
effective contracts, and enforcing property rights once they are claimed.  In this respect,
however, a system of conservation performance payments has much in common with less direct
interventions.  Both require institutions that can monitor ecosystem health, resolve conflict,
coordinate individual behavior, and allocate and enforce rights and responsibilities.
Unlike less direct development interventions, however, a system of conservation
contracting allows practitioners to focus their energies on designing these institutions.  In
contrast, conservation practitioners adopting indirect approaches must allocate their resources
across many more tasks in order to augment the capabilities of residents in remote rural areas to
cater to national and world markets.  Even when practitioners are successful, there is no
guarantee that market conditions will not change overnight, rendering the commercial activity
unprofitable and often stranding an expensive sunk investment.
                                                
12   We refer to the punchline of an often-repeated economist joke.  Three people—including one economist—are
out camping and find that they have not brought anything with which to open their canned food.  After the
economist has ridiculed her companions’ suggestions for dealing with the problem, they turn to her and say, “Okay,
since you’re so smart, what do you think we should do?”
     “First, assume a can opener,” she replies smugly.Resources for the Future Ferraro and Simpson
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In short, the direct incentive approach we advocate presumes the establishment of an
institutional context in which it can be implemented.  Indirect approaches, however, presume the
same ability to demarcate and enforce rights and responsibilities.  Moreover, they also require
greater sophistication on the part of donors in, for example, anticipating market trends and
predicting the conservation effects of specific investments.
As we have stated earlier, we do not dispute the wisdom of making profit-maximizing
investments in eco-friendly enterprises.  Our point is only that if such investments are not
financially wise, as we suspect is the case in many instances, they will not be cost-effective in
promoting conservation either.
Proponents often assert that indirect interventions encourage local economic
development.  In fact, we have shown that eco-entrepreneurs will likely favor subsidization of
output prices or the acquisition of complementary capital.  We have also shown, however, that
the donor can offer a grant to local agents such that both donor and eco-entrepreneurs are better
off under the direct approach.  Inasmuch as encouraging the growth of eco-friendly activities is a
form of industrial policy that would be difficult for most conservation donors to implement, we
do not find the “local economic development” argument compelling.
We argue that direct incentives make more sense than indirect ones.  We reach this
conclusion despite making assumptions that portray the indirect approach in the most favorable
light.  We assume that forest and capital are complements.  This need not necessarily be the case.
We also assume that the conservation benefits per unit area of forest used in eco-production are
equivalent to the conservation benefits that would be derived from non-use.  Relaxing this
assumption—allowing that even “eco-friendly” use would result in some degradation—makes it
even less likely that a donor would prefer an indirect approach.
We assume that the donor can identify ex ante the capital subsidy required to motivate
the conservation of the desired area of forest just as easily as he could identify the forest subsidy.
In reality, the donor may be able to ascertain the appropriate forest subsidy more easily (e.g., via
a procurement auction like that used by the U.S. Conservation Reserve Program).  We also
assume that the units of forest in which a donor is interested are the same units protected by the
entrepreneur when faced with cheaper capital or higher output prices.  As we observed in the
empirical example above, however, the forest protected under the two approaches may in fact not
be the same.  A direct payment approach has the advantage of permitting more precise targeting
of conservation funds, thus facilitating the maximization of environmental benefits per dollar
expended.Resources for the Future Ferraro and Simpson
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We assume that the capital acquired at subsidized prices will be employed in eco-
production.  Some forms of capital, however, may be easily diverted to less benign uses without
the donor’s knowledge.  In contrast, the donor may find it easier to monitor the amount of intact
forest protected by an individual or community.
As a final remark, we recognize that donors’ incentives are not always as simple as one
might suppose.  Many funders want to see clear, short-term results (Wells and Brandon 1992).  A
large capital investment may have greater visibility than would conservation payments intended
only to sustain the status quo.  In addition, some donors face political constraints.  Bilateral
donors, for example, often face strong pressures to engage their own nationals in foreign
assistance projects.  The more complex the project, the more easily this objective is
accomplished.
8.  Conclusion
In order to achieve ecosystem conservation objectives in low-income nations,
conservation practitioners have invested in promoting commercial enterprises intended to
generate local incentives for conservation.  By virtue of their complicated and indirect linkages
to conservation objectives, however, development interventions are often ill-suited for achieving
ecosystem conservation.
In contrast to the emphasis on indirect approaches to ecosystem conservation in low-
income nations, high-income nations and Costa Rica have been experimenting with approaches
based on conservation performance payments.  Costa Rica, in particular, is trying to create an
organized market for ecosystem services.  Despite the increasing use of direct payment
approaches, the role that contracting approaches can play in low-income countries has been
largely overlooked.
Our results suggest that conservation performance payments can be much more cost-
effective than indirect approaches.  Our model is simple and may not capture all of the relevant
aspects of the choice between indirect or direct approaches when achieving ecosystem
conservation.  However, we know of no other systematic effort to elucidate the nature of this
choice.  One of our main motivations in writing this piece is to invite other economists with an
interest in these issues to formalize more sophisticated models with contrary implications if
appropriate.  Our feeling, however, is that the more parsimonious approach should be adopted
until a compelling case is made for abandoning it.  Hence, we believe that continuedResources for the Future Ferraro and Simpson
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experimentation with direct conservation incentives in the developing world is warranted and
will prove successful.Resources for the Future Ferraro and Simpson
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Appendix:  Derivation of Overall Cost of Choosing an Indirect Rather than Direct
Approach
Consider a second-order approximation to the eco-entrepreneur’s profits when additional
forest is provided directly:
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Alternatively, if sufficient additional capital is provided to induce the eco-entrepreneur to acquire
one more hectare of forest, her profits will be approximately
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Using (2b) and (2c) (Hotelling’s Lemma) and rearranging, we have
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where F0 and K0 are the quantities of forest and capital demanded absent any subsidies.  The
interpretation of (A3) and (A4) is straightforward.  The first two terms on the left-hand side of
each is the difference in profits arising from ecoproduction resulting from the subsidy on forest
or capital.  The last term on the right-hand side is the value of the subsidy (i. e., the amount of
the subsidy per unit times demand after the subsidy).  Note, then, the left-hand sides of (A3) and
(A4) are the overall costs of the respective subsidy, defined as the difference in profits less
(again, recall that dpF and dpK are both negative by assumption) the cost of the subsidy.  The
right-hand side expressions are, then, “cost triangles,” the cost to the donor of providing
incentives that are not recovered via transfers to the eco-entrepreneur.
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where the right-hand side comes from Hotelling’s lemma and the derivations of the subsidies,
expressions (6a) and (6b).  Given our convexity assumptions, expression (A5) is positive (i.e.,
the direct approach is more cost-effective).  Using expressions (4), (5), and (6b), we can derive
an alternative expression for the additional costs incurred when the indirect approach is chosen
over the direct approach:
()




.( A 6 )
Thus, the relative cost advantage of the direct approach is proportional to the difference in capital
demanded.Resources for the Future Ferraro and Simpson
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